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In his latest article, Professor Robert Ahdieh takes a broad, open-handed
swipe at conventional law and economics' reliance on methodological
individualism.I He hits solidly and right on point at those many places where
the discipline is vulnerable to this critique. But is the critique is too expansive?
One might read in Professor Ahdieh's article an assertion that methodological
individualism has completely blinded, or at least distorted, the view of law and
economics scholarship with respect to identity, culture, politics, norms,
society, evolutionary processes, and history, among other considerations. 2 If
that is his assertion, a solution for these pervasive problems would seem a
hopeless endeavor for the discipline. It is hard to imagine a law and economics
framework that adequately addresses these concerns and remains recognizable.
No elastic methodology could possibly encompass all these considerations
and retain its disciplinary boundary. Professor Ahdieh does not, of course,
argue that law and economics scholarship needs to incorporate every
consideration (e.g., identity, history, culture, etc.) across the board, but rather
only in those areas characterized significantly by interdependence. His claim
is that salient aspects of interaction are lost in law and economics analyses
characterized by interdependence, and he is surely correct. But now what? Is
the solution found by simply calling for modest changes - a bit more
awareness of identity, culture, history and the like - or even a mere
acknowledgement of the limits of the conventional model in areas of
interdependence? I do not believe that such modesty would satisfy the
challenges the piece raises. Satisfaction would require a significant overhaul
of the traditional approach, but at what cost? Can law and economics thrive as
it has, or even survive, by broadening its reach to accommodate the omissions
identified?
Professor Ahdieh identifies four distinct areas of interdependence -
involving social norms, network externalities, coordination and common
knowledge - where an excessive focus on individualism leads the conventional
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analytic framework astray.3 "Consent" is one of three primary examples used
to illustrate the consequences of the basic methodological oversight, which is
grounded in insensitivity to human interdependence. "[A]s a matter of
methodology, it is unclear that indicia of consent are especially relevant to the
analysis of settings of interdependence," argues Professor Ahdieh.4 He asserts,
"our placement of normative weight on private contracting choices may be
unwarranted in such settings."5 I suspect that a number of law and economics
scholars would simultaneously concede the point regarding interdependence
and still place normative weight on consent (albeit not a fully subjective one)
in such settings.
We are touching on matters with some history. Years ago, Jerome Frank
observed that the so-called objectivists had dispensed with meaningful consent,
in much the same way they look past actual intent to form contracts. 6 For
them, said Frank, "putting too much stress on unique individual motivations,
would destroy that legal certainty and stability which a modem commercial
society demands."' 7 The individual, in the objectivist approach, was only a
fiction, which of course threatened "a sort of paradox." 8  "For a 'free
enterprise' system is, theoretically, founded on 'individualism'; but, in the
name of economic individualism, the objectivists refused to consider those
reactions of actual specific individual," concluded Frank.9 Thus, "'[e]conomic
individualism' . . . shows up as hostile to real individualism." 10 Moreover, the
normative weight placed on the economic individualism notion of consent is
not necessarily weaker, just differently focused - a notion grounded less in
autonomy than it is in efficiency. Theorists made a judgment to establish this
focus.
The basic tension between a robust, or real, individualism and an economic
one is not easily addressed by modest methodological adjustments. Take, for
example, the important work of George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton cited in
the article.1' Professor Ahdieh gives a nod to their effort of bringing "identity
I Id. at 58.
4 Id. at 73.
' Id. at 72.
6 Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 42 (Anchor Books 1971)
(1930).




" See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW
OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 6 (2010); George A. Akerlof
& Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. EcoN. 715, 715 (2000); George A.
Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups, 98 AM. ECON. REV.
212, 212 (2008).
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into economic analysis." 12  Note, however, that Professors Akerlof and
Kranton are focused on a particular type of identity: social identity. They
introduce an individual's status as black, white, gay, straight, jock, nerd and
the like within their framework.' 3 Even in this more sophisticated model,
matters of choice and consent remain elusive. Professor Patricia Williams, for
example, recalled in The Alchemy of Race and Rights, an interaction with a
colleague that made clear the limits of choice over her own social identity: "I
was acutely aware that the choice of identifying as black (as opposed to
white?) was hardly mine; that as long as I am identified as black by the
majority of others, my own identifying as black will almost surely follow as a
simple fact of human interdependency."' 14 A richer model that incorporates
important elements of social identity may be more descriptively accurate, and
might even suggest new insights, but the better model still does not tell us the
appropriate normative emphasis to place choice and consent. Akerlof and
Kranton's methodological adjustment does not address the problem of placing
too much or too little emphasis on the choices of persons.
In my own work on racial restrictive covenants - i.e., agreements among
property owners to prohibit sales, rentals, use or occupancy of their properties
to persons of specified races, religions, ethnicities or nationalities - the limits
of modeling adjustments are apparent. 15  A long-standing debate in the
literature on restrictive covenants circled around whether they were effective in
maintaining segregation before 1950. The noted historian Arnold Hirsch, for
example, claimed they had little impact because courts would often not enforce
them: covenants "served as little more than a fairly coarse sieve, unable to stop
the flow of [the] black population when put to the test."' 16 The renowned
economists Gunnar Myrdal took the opposite view, saying that if the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled covenants unenforceable - which it did in 194817 -
"segregation in the North would be nearly doomed."'1 8 Despite their differing
conclusions, notice that both Hirsh and Myrdal treat legal enforceability of
covenants as the linchpin to their effectiveness. Yet, we know that even after
the 1948 ruling, lawyers continued to write these restrictions into deeds;
12 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 59.
13 AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 11, at 1 1-16.
14 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 10 (1991) (emphasis
added).
"5 Richard R.W. Brooks, Covenants Without Courts: Enforcing Residential Segregation
with Legally Unenforceable Agreements, 101 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.)
(forthcoming May 2011) (on file with author).
16 ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO,
1940-1960, at 30 (1983).
17 The Court found judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948), but that such
agreements between private parties alone do not violate the constitution, id. at 13.
18 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 624 (1944).
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insurers, banks, and even the Federal Housing Administration continued to
reference them; title companies continued to report them; and registries of
deeds continued to record them. 19 The effectiveness of covenants did not
exclusively hinge on their legal enforceability; rather, covenants were signals
that coordinated the behavior of a variety of private individual and institutional
actors - signals that remained effective despite their later legal
unenforceability. 2° By thinking of covenant as tools in a coordination game,
additional equilibria emerge. Concerns of methodological individualism
remain in my slightly adjusted game, however, most apparently in the common
knowledge assumptions that support these new equilibria. 21 Similarly, recent
work on social norms have improved significantly upon simpler models that
preceded it,22 but comes nowhere near reaching a comprehensive response to
the problems Professor Ahdieh raises.23
Professor Adhieh's article identifies the pervasive omissions that continue to
characterize law and economics analyses, my own included, that take for
granted a certain methodological individualism and its trappings. The question
unanswered, it seems to me, is whether these omissions are oversights -
possibly subject to incorporation into a richer methodological framework - or
whether the omissions are intended to be excluded in order to advance the
approach, albeit at some cost. Just as the objectivists were cognizant of the
compromise they struck (abandoning "real individualism" for the sake of
tractability), so too are many law and economics scholars aware of
compromises made to achieve certain results. Efficient breach might be one
such case of acknowledged compromise. The idea advocated by some scholars
that contract promises are merely options with a strike price set by expectation
damages 24 may fairly characterize the beliefs of commercial transactors
(although I seriously doubt that, but let's proceed arguendo). Among these
advocates, normative weight might be placed on a regime consistent with, or
even encouraging, breach when it can be done so profitably. The advocates, of
course, recognize that everyone does not share this normative view, but for the
sake of efficiency the view of contract as option, rather than contract as
19 Brooks, supra note 15.
20 id.
21 Professor Ahdieh addresses the problem of common knowledge and methodological
individualism. Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 66; see also HERBERT GINTIs, THE BOUNDS OF
REASON: GAME THEORY AND THE UNIFICATION OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 146-63
(2009).
22 See, e.g., AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 11, at 7 (recognizing that "economists
have had neither the language nor the analytical apparatus... to describe [social] norms and
motivations").
23 See Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 60 (observing that "Akerlof and Kranton do not explicitly
challenge methodological individualism").
24 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897)
("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages
if you do not keep it, - and nothing else.").
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promise - as Charles Fried famously put it25 - may represent an acknowledged
trade-off between competing normative aims of autonomy and efficiency.
Professor Ahdieh's comprehensive and thoughtful critique has highlighted
all of the costs and compromises struck as a consequence of the discipline's
tight embrace of methodological individualism. 26 It is unclear which of these
consequences are inessential results of mere oversight, and which are
necessarily dragged along by larger normative pulls or are desired by
proponents of the traditional law and economics approach. Certainly, for the
former (those omissions that are mere oversights) Professor Ahdieh's article
makes a compelling case for reevaluation of the pervasive assumption of
methodological individualism in law and economics. For omissions that are
part of the model, Professor Ahdieh's article has made clear the costs. Now
the onus is on the advocates to demonstrate the benefits.
25 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1-2 (1981).
26 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 70-82.
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